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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                               
   
 
No. 17-3815 
   
                      
WILBUR RAMIREZ-PEREZ, 
 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
      
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (No. A205-986-790) 
Immigration Judge Rosalind K. Malloy 
           
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 9, 2021 
 
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 7, 2021) 
                     
   
 
OPINION* 
                                 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Wilbur Ramirez-Perez petitions for review of the denial by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Because the agency’s 
decisions are supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition.1 
I.  
Ramirez-Perez is a Salvadoran native and citizen who entered the United States 
without inspection in 2005 or 2006.  In 2013, his sister, who owns a small business in El 
Salvador, received phone calls from gang members demanding money.  His sister 
decided not to pay the gang and went to the police instead, who arrested one of the gang 
members.  Ramirez-Perez fears that, if he returns to El Salvador, the gang members who 
attempted to extort his sister will come after him because they will discover he recently 
returned to the country and erroneously believe he has lots of money.   
In June 2013, removal proceedings against Ramirez-Perez began.  He thereafter 
applied for the relief noted above.  An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications 
in March 2017.  The IJ found that Ramirez-Perez’s application for asylum was untimely.  
Ramirez-Perez argued “changed circumstances” excused the delay, but the IJ rejected this 
argument.  The IJ also dismissed Ramirez-Perez’s remaining claims, determining that he 
failed to establish a clear probability that he would be persecuted based on a protected 
 
1 Ramirez-Perez also filed a second petition for review under case number 19-2511.  The 
two cases were consolidated and held in abeyance pending decisions in similar cases 
from our Court and the Supreme Court.  In May 2021, the parties jointly moved to 
remand case number 19-2511 to the BIA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-
Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021).  We will grant that motion under separate 
cover, and this opinion shall address solely the issues raised in case number 17-3815. 
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ground if he returned to El Salvador or that the Salvadoran government would acquiesce 
to any torture he might suffer.  The BIA rejected his appeal, and he filed a timely petition 
for review. 
II.  
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e).  
We have jurisdiction over final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Where, 
as here, the BIA adopts an IJ’s decision and adds analysis of its own, we review both 
decisions.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review legal 
conclusions anew, Cadapan v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014), and factual 
determinations for substantial evidence, Dwumaah v. Att’y Gen., 609 F.3d 586, 589 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Under the deferential substantial-evidence standard, “we must uphold the 
agency’s determination unless the evidence would compel any reasonable fact finder to 
reach a contrary result.”  Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
A. Asylum and Statutory Withholding of Removal 
Ramirez-Perez contends he is eligible for asylum2 and statutory withholding of 
removal based on his fear that he will be persecuted by the gangs who extorted his sister.  
We agree with the IJ and the BIA that both applications fail.   
 
2 Ramirez-Perez also takes issue with the agency’s failure to consider what he believes to 
be “changed circumstances” justifying his untimely asylum application.  Because we 
conclude his asylum application would fail on the merits in any event, we need not 
address this argument. 
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To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, persecution must be on 
account of a protected characteristic—race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).  In other words, a petitioner must demonstrate that his protected 
characteristic is “‘one central reason’ why he was or will be targeted for persecution.” 
Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 684–85 (citation omitted).  Ramirez-Perez claims he fears 
persecution based on his membership in several social groups, including “family 
members of business owners in El Salvador who have resisted gang demands” and 
“immediate family members of his sister.”  Pet. Br. at 20. 
Assuming, as the BIA and IJ did, that Ramirez-Perez’s proposed social groups are 
recognized (itself a doubtful proposition), he has still failed to show that his membership 
in those groups was a “central reason for the persecution.”  Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d 
at 685.  He testified that, if he goes back to El Salvador, the gangs “are going to think that 
I have a lot of money, they are going . . . [to] ask me for money or they’re going to ask 
me to join them and I don’t want to do it.”  A.R. 129.  But that fear is premised on his 
tenuous speculation that the gangs will believe he has much money or want to recruit 
him, not on his membership in any particular social group that we recognize.  Cf. Gomez-
Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[The relevant] incident was 
not centrally motivated by any . . . social group status . . ., but rather by a desire to recruit 
Petitioner.”).  And although Ramirez-Perez has pointed to one incident involving threats 
to his sister, “isolated criminal acts,” in this case, several years after Ramirez-Perez left 
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El Salvador, “do not constitute persecution on account of a protected characteristic.”  
Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 685.   
Even if Ramirez-Perez had established a fear of persecution based on a protected 
characteristic, he would still need to show that the Salvadoran government is “unable or 
unwilling” to control that persecution.  Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citation omitted).  This he has not done.  The IJ and BIA observed that after Ramirez-
Perez’s sister was threatened, she reported the threat to the police, and they not only 
conducted a sting operation but also arrested one of the persons who was extorting his 
sister.  This is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the Salvadoran 
government is not unable or unwilling to control any persecution Ramirez-Perez might 
face.  We thus reject his asylum and withholding claims. 
B. Relief under the CAT 
 
To succeed on a CAT claim, a petitioner must show it is more likely than not that 
he would be tortured if he is removed to his country of nationality and that the torture 
would be inflicted by or at the acquiescence of a “public official acting in an official 
capacity.”  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 208.18.  The BIA and IJ denied Ramirez-Perez’s CAT 
claim because they found it was too speculative.  A.R. 5, 80–81.  Substantial evidence 
supports this conclusion.  Ramirez-Perez has pointed to nothing more than a speculative 
fear that a gang will ask him for money or recruit him.  Moreover, he testified that the 
police actively targeted and arrested the person who was extorting his sister.  Far from 
demonstrating acquiescence in torture, this testimony suggests the Salvadoran 
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government affirmatively tried to prevent mistreatment of Ramirez-Perez and his family.  
We therefore reject his CAT claim and, with that complete, the petition for review. 
